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203 Appendix D THE CHANGING POLITICAL-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT: SOUTH ASIA Ashley J. Tellis The warranter environment in south Asia has remained relatively un-settled since the Indian and Pakistani atomic tests of May 1998. The Indian g all overnments groundss to in ordinary emphasize the challenges china posed in the weeks direct up to those testsafter more(prenominal) than a cristal of mostly sotto voce complaintsserved to geological fault the or-dinarily glacial process of normalizing Sino-Indian relations. This process unceasingly possessed a certain fragility in that the gradually de-creasing tensions along the Sino-Indian deposit did non automatically translate into increased trust amongst capital of Red chinaware and travel Delhi. Even as both(prenominal) sides desire to derive tactical advantages from the confi-dence- building measures they had negotiated since 1993for ex-ample, the drawdown of forces along the utterly unfriendly LAC in the Himalayas seve rally ended up pursuing larger luxe strategies that effectively undercut the others interests. Beijing, for example, per-sisted in covertly assisting the thermo thermo thermonuclear and rocket programs of Indias local competitor, Pakistan, bandage brand-new Delhi seek in re-sponse to obtain an intermediate-range ballistic missile whose comparative habitual utility company lay primarily in targeting China. The tell identification of China as a threat to Indian interests by both Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders and other important Indian elites in the first half of 1998 not single underscored the fragile constitution of the Sino-Indian rapprochement but similarly ruptured the guardedly maintained façade of improving relations between the twain coun-204 The United States and Asia tries.1 When this public finger expressing ultimately gave way to Indias resumption of nuclear exam on May 11, 1998 (an character ac-companied by the Indian prime ministers univoca l claim that those tests were dictated by t! he hostile actions of Indias Union neighbor over the years), security competition in atomic number 16 Asiawhich usually appears, at least in popular perceptions, as merely a bilateral affair between India and Pakistan hithertotually revealed itself as the voiceal strategical triangle2 it has always been. This appendix analyzes Indian and Pakistani attitudes toward China in the linguistic context of the three-sided security competition in South Asia. fetching the 1998 nuclear tests as its point of departure, it assesses how China figures in the grand strategies of the dickens principal sound outs in the Indian subcontinent and identifies the principal regional geopolitical contingencies for which the United States should pre-pare over the next decade. Finally, it briefly analyzes the kinds of opportunities the region offers to the airforce as it engages, even as it prepares to hedge against, a insurrection China. NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE TRIANGULAR SECURITY contender IN SOU TH ASIA Impact of the Nuclear Tests on Sino-Indian dealing Although Pakistan was at a time affected by the Indian nuclear tests, these tests busy Chinese security interests as well. To begin with, Indias finale to seize on testing made manifest New Delhis re-sentment toward Beijing for its almost two-decade-long assistance to capital of Pakistans nuclear and missile programs. Indias official claim that its resumption of nuclear testing was precipitated at least in part by miscellaneous Chinese actions (such as the transfer of nuclear weapon designs, short ballistic missiles, and assorted technologies in-tended to enable Islamabad to produce strategic systems indige-nously) was meant to signal the fact that India was capable of ______________ 1 These azoic 1998 events leave been summarized in Manoj Joshi, George in the China Shop, India Today, May 18, 1998, pp. 1016. 2 For a rock-steady discussion, see Brahma Chellaney, The regional strategic Triangle, in Brahma Chellane y (ed.), Securing Indias Future in the New Millennium! , New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999, pp. 313336.The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia 205 argue its own security interestsif necessary through slanted solutionsand that overture in almost aspects of Sino-Indian bilateral relations could not be sustained if it came at the expense of undercutting the core intent of preserving Indias safety, integrity, and primacy in South Asia.3 Further, the decisiveness to test and the financial avowal that India would de-velop a nuclear deterrent implied that New Delhi would at around point seek to target China with nuclear weapons. This bowel movement at re-placing abject vulnerability with mutual vulnerabilityno matter how asymmetrical it might besuggested that Indian policymakers were ad-lib to hang their hopes solely on the peacefulness of Chinese intentions, in particular over the long term, given that Beijings big businessman is expected to grow even kick upstairs and the relative derivative in its strategic capa bilities vis-à-vis New Delhi is believably to become even more manifest. Indias decision to rise up a nuclear deterrent thus suggests that India seeks at a minimum to possess the kinds of deter-rent capabilities that result immunize it against possible Chinese nu-clear coerce in the event of a crisis.4 Finally, Indias decision to resume nuclear testing has also been complemented by an social movement to modernize the Indian militaryan ef-fort that has encompassed upgrading Indias conventional forces, including those elements tasked with fend for the mountainous run into areas facing both Pakistan and China. This modernization, which slowed down during the nineties for financial reasons, is likely to gather momentum during the coming decade as Indian security managers increasingly recognize that, disregarding of what happens in the land of diplomatic relations, maintaining robust conven-tional capabilities remains not only the vanquish insurance against deter-rence break down but also a resilient precondition for making go! od on Indias public pledge never to use nuclear weapons first.5 ______________ 3 This matter is emphasized in J.

Mohan Malik, India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, be and Implications, Contemporary southeasterly Asia, Vol. 20, none 2, August 1998, pp. 191215. 4 The tiny importance of deterring blackmail in Indian calculations is higher(prenominal)lighted in Jasjit Singh, why Nuclear Weapons? in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Nuclear India, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998, pp. 925. 5 For more on this calculus, see Tellis (2001). 206 The United States and Asia The Sino-Indian labyrinthine sense Indias novel decision t o conduct nuclear tests, to develop a nuclear deterrent, and to accelerate the oft-postponed modernization of its conventional forces has oftentimes engendered the conclusion that New Delhi now views Beijing as a clear and make up danger to its secu-rity. In point of fact, this is not the case. To be sure, the Indian capi-tal would appear to be heavy populated by individuals, work out tanks, and associations who vociferously uphold the imminence of the Chi-nese threat. These claims are usually base either on Western reve-lations about Beijings assistance to Islamabads nuclear and missile programs and its turbid activities in Burma or, alternatively, on dis-tant fears such as the prospect of a rapidly evolution China returning to complete its docket of topic reunion at a time when it will have dramatically surpassed India in most of the relevant cate-gories of national spring.6 These challenges, howeverdarn ac-knowledged both by elected Indian officials and by the high b ureaucracy in New Delhihave not produced the kinds of! reactions Indian commentators have often expected because, repose simply, In-dias state managers have a more than better grasp of the Sino-Indian power balance than many analysts give them cite for. For more than a decade, Indian policymakers have in public pur-sued a shrewd policy toward Beijing. Although the forceful statements of several Indian leaders in the months surrounding the nuclear tests were exceptions to this rule, more modern Indian initiatives vis-à-vis Chinaincluding the June 1999 visit of Indian Foreign diplomatic minister Jas firing Singh to Beijingsuggest that Indias China policy has of late swung back from the extreme of polemical criticism to a much(prenominal) more centrist effort at realistically managing the complexity and tensions inherent in the Sino-Indian relationship.7 The logic of this effort can high hat be appreciated in the context of un-derstanding the perceptions of aged(a) Indian security managers with ______________ 6 These conc erns are summarized in Amitabh Mattoo, complacence round Chinese Threat Called Frightening, India Abroad, April 5, 1996. 7 A good comment of the complexity of Sino-Indian relations can be ensnare in Surjit Mansingh, Sino-Indian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1994, pp. 285300. If you want to get a full essay, tell apart it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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